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Federal Civil Procedure-WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE-McDougall v.
Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972).
The work product doctrine' protects from pretrial discovery witness
statements and other documents gathered by an adversary's counsel in the
course of preparation for possible litigation.' The purpose of the work prod-
uct doctrine is to preserve the privacy and independence of lawyers by
denying unwarranted intrusions into their private files and mental pro-
cesses.' Prior to the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, courts applied two distinct tests when considering whether to allow
pretrial discovery of documents and witness statements. One test required
the party seeking discovery to show good cause4 why discovery should be
allowed. The alternative test required the moving party to demonstrate
either the necessity for the production of the work product materials or
that denial of such discovery would unduly prejudice his case and cause
hardship or injustice.' Not only did the courts have difficulty distinguish-
ing between the good cause test of Rule 34 and the necessity or undue
hardship test,' but the courts also were faced with the question of whether
the work product privilege could be extended to work prepared by a non-
attorney.'
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
2. Id. at 505. In deciding whether to apply the work product immunity it has been held
that the test is "[Niot whether the litigation has begun but whether the documents may be
said to have been prepared or obtained in anticipation of litigation." Arney v. George A.
Hormel & Co., 53 F.R.D. 179, 181 (D. Minn. 1971).
3. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
4. FED. R. Civ. P. 34, 6 F.R.D. 238 (1947). This requirement was imposed on both work
product and non-work product materials. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc.
rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (1972). Cases prior to 1970 generally interpreted good cause as mere
relevancy with regard to non-evaluative investigative materials not prepared in anticipation
of trial, but required a showing of necessity with regard to work product materials. Id. See,
e.g., Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968).
5. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509 (1947).
6. Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (1972). The
confusion involved reconciling two verbally distinct requirements; Rule 34, which applied
both to work product and non-work product materials, and the Hickman test for discovery
of trial preparation materials. Thus the showing required for production of materials varied
as the type of materials sought varied. Good cause meant a showing of necessity or justifica-
tion for materials protected by the Hickman work product privilege. For non-work product
materials, however, some courts equated good cause with relevance, e.g., Connecticut Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17 F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), while others held that the moving
party must demonstrate more than relevance, but less than the Hickman standard, e.g.,
Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968). Courts admitted the issue of good
cause was "[Ujnsettled and has been the subject of sharp controversy .. " Id. at 127.
7. The Court emphasized that Hickman involved witness statements taken by a lawyer and
left open the issue of whether a non-lawyer could claim work product protection. There are
contrary lower court holdings on this issue. Compare Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971,
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The 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resolved
these issues by deleting the good cause requirement of Rule 34.1 Instead,
Rule 26 (b) (1) now requires a showing of relevance9 for production of non-
work product materials. To obtain pretrial discovery of work product mate-
rials the petitioner, under Rule 26 (b)(3), must now demonstrate that he
has substantial need of the materials and is unable without undue hard-
ship to obtain their substantial equivalent.'0 In addition the rules establish
that the work product privilege extends to a non-attorney who prepares
materials in anticipation of litigation."
In McDougall v. Dunn'2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted
the issue of pretrial discovery of documents ostensibly protected by the
work product doctrine. In McDougall, shortly after an accident in which
defendant's car crashed into a tree, a claims adjuster for defendant's insur-
ance company secured from the defendant driver a statement admitting
his negligence.' 3 The plaintiff, a passenger in the car, moved to require the
defendant to produce this statement. The district court overruled the mo-
tion on the grounds that the statements were the attorney's work product."
976 (3d Cir. 1949) (statements obtained by FBI agents accorded Hickman privileges since
court could find no logical distinction between witness statements obtained by counsel per-
sonally and those obtained by others for counsel's use), with Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309
F.2d 569, 572 (5th Cir. 1962) (statements taken by claims agent held not work product).
8. Rule 34, instead of imposing its own prerequisite of good cause, now allows discovery of
documents and tangible things, subject to the restrictive provisions of Rule 26(b). FED. R.
Civ. P. 34. Thus the showings required for discovery are no longer enumerated in Rule 34,
but instead are found in Rule 26(b).
9. Relevance is to be broadly interpreted as anything relevant to the subject matter of the
action, rather than being relevant to the precise issues framed by the pleadings. Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 52 F.R.D. 367, 369 (E.D. Wis. 1971). The test of
relevance is not to be construed as the narrow test used in determining admissability of
evidence upon a trial. Rediker v. Warfield, 11 F.R.D. 125, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Rather,
anything is relevant if it is "[R]easonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
10. The party seeking discovery must show that he "[Hi]as substantial need of the materi-
als in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Courts have
recognized that Rule 26(b)(3) replaces the Hickman necessity or undue hardship test for
discovery of work product materials. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54
F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See Peterson v. United States; 52 F.R.D. 317,321 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
11. "[A] party may obtain discovery of documents. . . prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative (including
his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing of (sub-
stantial need and inability without undue hardship to obtain their substantial equiva-
lent). . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
12. 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir. 1972).
13. The defendant conceded that he had been drinking prior to the accident, that he was
not maintaining a proper lookout, and that he was speeding. Id. at 471 n.2.
14. 468 F.2d at 471. The defendant resisted the motion, objecting to discovery of materials
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On appeal, the circuit court held that the statements were not work prod-
uct and, even if they were, they were discoverable since plaintiff did not
engage counsel and had no opportunity to obtain witness statements until
more than two years after the accident. 5
The court of appeals noted the lower court's error 6 in characterizing as
work product the statements taken by the claims adjuster in the regular
course of his duties. 7 The court, although recognizing that a non-lawyer
can claim work product privileges, held that to be work product statements
must be requested by or prepared for an attorney. 8
The court, unwilling to reverse on this point alone, cited the importance
of fresh and contemporaneous witness statements, 9 and the inability of
prepared in anticipation of litigation without a showing of good cause. The record of the
circuit court is mute both as to why the district court accepted this contention, and what
arguments the plaintiff advanced to support his motion to produce.
15. Plaintiff suffered a brain injury and was hospitalized for almost a year, and did not
institute a lawsuit until almost two and a half years after the accident. 468 F.2d 468, 470 (4th
Cir. 1972).
16. 468 F.2d at 473. It has been generally held that statements taken by a claims adjuster
in the regular course of business and prior to the commencement of a suit are not accorded
the protection of the work product doctrine. Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir.
1962); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Bums v. New York Cent. R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309 (N.D. Ohio 1963). Contra, Almaguer v. Chicago,
Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).
17. An insurance company is not called into action until one of its policyholders has
suffered an injury and submitted a claim. If the courts held that all reports prepared in
response to such claims were prepared in anticipation of litigation, the liberal intent of the
rules of discovery would be frustrated, as almost all internal documents of insurance compa-
nies relating to claimants would be discoverable only upon showing of substantial need and
undue hardship. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D.
Ill. 1972). See Peterson v. United States, 52 F.R.D. 317, 320-21 (S.D. Ill. 1971).
18. 468 F.2d at 473, quoting Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D.
367, 372 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The court's decision means that a lawyer must decide that a suit is
a foreseeable contingency for the work product doctrine to operate. This holding would seem
to articulate the practice of insurance companies which allow middle management (including
attorneys), and not claims investigators, to review accident reports and decide whether to
contest the claim. This holding, furthermore, seems to be in line with prior case law. Southern
Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna
Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Bums v. New York Cent. R.R., 33 F.R.D. 309 (N.D.
Ohio 1963); Morrone v. Southern Pac. Co., 7 F.R.D. 214 (S.D. Cal. 1947). Contra, Almaguer
v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).
19. Many courts have recognized that the inability of a party to secure a witness statement
until a significant time after an accident constitutes good cause under old Rule 34. Southern
Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968); Goosman v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th
Cir. 1963); Southern Ry. v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962); Guilford Nat'l Bank v.
Southern Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962); New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433 (4th
Cir. 1957); De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947). For a similar
decision holding contemporaneous witness statements discoverable as work product under
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plaintiff2 " to obtain such statements. Granting for the sake of argument the
assumption that the statements were work product, the court held that the
plaintiff had demonstrated the requisite substantial need and inability,
without undue hardship, to obtain the substantial equivalent 2 of the state-
ments. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiff was entitled to pretrial
discovery.
The holding in McDougall concurs with the result reached by many
courts that have decided a similar issue on the basis of the good cause
test.2 The McDougall decision, however, rests on Rule 26 (b)(3), and thus
represents a judicial delineation of what constitutes substantial need and
undue hardship.? This case is not an abrogation of the work product doc-
trine, but rather is a logical extension of the case law and trends24 that
resulted in the 1970 revision to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
McDougall establishes that witness statements taken shortly after an acci-
dent are discoverable if the party seeking discovery had no opportunity to
secure statements until a significant time after the accident. By granting
the assumption that the statements involved are work product,2 the case
amended Rule 26 see United States v. Murphy Cook & Co., 52 F.R.D. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
20. See note 15 supra.
21. 468 F.2d at 473. The defendant's defense was contributory negligence. The statements
sought were the only direct evidence on this issue since plaintiff, as a result of a brain injury
sustained in the accident, had amnesia and was unable to reconstruct events surrounding the
accident. Id. at 470-71.
22. See note 19 supra.
23. Other courts have recognized that the following conditions can constitute substantial
need and undue hardship under Rule 26(b)(3): Amey v. George A. Hormal & Co., 53 F.R.D.
179 (D. Minn. 1971) (if information is not discoverable via other discovery methods); Fidelity
& Deposit Co. v. S. Stefan Strauss, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (an adverse witness
or a witness's testimony differing from his statement); United States v. Murphy Cook & Co.,
52 F.R.D. 363 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (discovery of contemporaneous witness statements allowed, due
to lapse of time and fading of witnesses' memories).
24. Hickman states that "[P]roduction might be justified where the witnesses are no
longer available. . . ." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947). This is essentially the
situation in McDougall, since plaintiff had amnesia and was unable to reconstruct events
surrounding the accident. Case law prior to 1970 generally required only a showing of relev-
ance for non-trial preparation materials, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Shields, 17
F.R.D. 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But, even as to the trial preparatory work of non-lawyers, courts
generally required a much greater showing of need before allowing discovery of work product
materials, e.g., Hauger v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954).
See generally Advisory Committee's Note, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. rule 26, 28 U.S.C.A. (1972).
25. Cases cited in McDougall in support of this proposition (witness statements are discov-
erable if party seeking discovery had no chance to secure statements until a significant time
after the accident) involve witness statements which are not work product. Southern Ry. v.
Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1968) (statements were taken by a claims agent); Goosman
v. A. Duie Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963) (statements required by law); Southern Ry.
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stretches the aforementioned proposition to cover statements protected by
the work product privilege.
D.P.R.
v. Campbell, 309 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1962) (claims agent); Guilford Nat'l Bank v. Southern
Ry., 297 F.2d 921 (4th Cir. 1962) (claims agent); New York Cent. R.R. v. Carr, 251 F.2d 433
(4th Cir. 1957) (claims agent); De Bruce v. Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947)
(claims agent).
